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The incomparable force of Solzhenitsyn is connected with his person, to what defines his
message: the unconditional refusal of the lie. It can happen that one cannot tell the truth, he
repeats, but one can always refuse the lie. The Soviet regime appears to him to be perverse
as such because it institutionalizes the lie: despotism calls itself liberty, the press subjugated to
a party pretends to be free, and at the time of the Great Purge, Stalin pro- claimed the
Constitution to be the most democratic in the world. Solzhenitsyn’s voice carries far and high
because it does not weary of calling us back to the intrinsic perversity of totalitarianism. —
Raymond Aron, Le Figaro, June 12, 1975.1
Raymond Aron and Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn are two authors who have been very important to
me over the years. The first is a French philosopher turned political scientist or political
sociologist who helped shape moderate and conservative opinion in France— and Europe—in
the years after WWII. He showed the greatest lucidity in confronting the unique evil that is
totalitarianism and was a model of balanced or equitable political reflection. The second, as we
have seen, is a world historical figure, a writer of unsurpassed talent who dissected the Lie that
is coextensive with ideology like no one else in the twentieth century. While both men were
proud and principled opponents of Communist totalitarianism, at first glance they do not
appear to be natural interlocutors. Aron was a secular, self-described “de-Judaized” Jew,
although one who displayed no hostility to revealed religion. He was an adherent of the
moderate enlightenment, preferring Montesquieu and Tocqueville to the theoretical and
practical radicalism of the philosophes and the Jacobin tradition. He was a French patriot who
carefully balanced liberal universalism with a rational and affective attachment to his patrie.
Solzhenitsyn, too, was a patriot who did not feel obliged to lie for his country. In contrast to
Aron, Solzhenitsyn combined an attachment to self-government with a sweeping
condemnation of the “anthropocentricity” at the heart of enlightenment and post-Enlightenment
thought.2 Yet he, too, was a “liberal” of sorts as Aron fully appreciated. In fact, in the ten years
before his death in October 1983, Aron wrote extensively, and always intelligently and
sympathetically, about Solzhenitsyn. At a time when American liberals and leftists (and many
Europeans, too) were turning vehemently against Solzhenitsyn— accusing him of
authoritarianism and worse—Aron remained an unqualified admirer of the Russian writer.
For Aron, Solzhenitsyn was more than a political figure. The Russian zek represented an
unconditional “spiritual” commitment to truth and liberty. Solzhenitsyn was the critic par
excellence of the modern ideological “lie” that human nature and the laws of social existence
could be “engineered” out of existence. Like
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Solzhenitsyn, Aron denied that some “super-reality” divined by ideology could replace the real
world in which human beings live, breathe, and struggle. He understood that Communism had
to create a fictive world ruled by ideological clichés, an ideocracy or logocracy dominated by
lies, if it was to obscure the gap between social reality and the pretensions of ideology to
remake human beings and society at a stroke. Aron wrote extensively about historical
consciousness and endorsed a moderate version of modern “progress.”3 But fundamentally he
did not believe that human nature could be changed. He adamantly refused to replace the
primordial human distinction between good and evil with the pernicious ideological distinction
between Progress and Reaction. He refused to subordinate human beings to ideological
abstractions.
Aron was not a religious believer, at least not in any conventional sense, but he profoundly
admired the spiritual witness of Solzhenitsyn. He never turned on the Russian writer or allowed
their differences to undermine his admiration for him. He did not share Solzhenitsyn’s religious
faith, or some of his core ideas, such as the “critique of the whole body of modern civilization
since the Renaissance,”4 or his adherence to the theses of the Club of Rome (from 1973) on
the immanence of ecological catastrophe and degradation.5 He also did not share
Solzhenitsyn’s view from the mid-1970s that the West had lost WWIII in the years after 1945,
and was then in danger of losing WWIV.6 At the same time, he shared Solzhenitsyn’s
misgivings about détente especially when it was accompanied by ideological illusions about
Communism. But Aron never caricatured Solzhenitsyn or attributed to him positions that he did
not hold. His treatment of the Russian writer is equitable from beginning to end.
Letter to the Soviet Leaders
Aron was one of the few commentators in the Western world to appreciate the fundamentally
“libertarian” character of Solzhenitsyn’s 1973 Letter to the Soviet Leaders. Where others
wrongly attributed to it a theoretical endorsement of authoritarianism, Aron saw an admirable
effort to free the people of the Soviet Union from the stranglehold of ideocracy. Aron fully
appreciated the subtlety of Solzhenitsyn’s Letter. The carefully crafted Letter aimed to
persuade men shaped by fifty-five years of ideological despotism that it was in their interest,
and in the interest of the Russian people, to begin the long descent from the “icy cliffs”7 of
totalitarianism. Aron saw that Solzhenitsyn was asking for nothing less than “ideological
surrender”8 on the part of the Soviet leaders. When he told them that they could hold on to
political power as long as they jettisoned the official ideology, respected private property,
allowed freedom of thought and speech, decollectivized agriculture, and stopped persecuting
religious believers, many thought they had discerned a weakness for authoritarianism.9 They
did not read the Letter with care or with the slightest sense of the rhetoric one might use in
speaking to the morally unscrupulous caretakers of an ideological despotism. In contrast, Aron
knew that Solzhenitsyn was striking at the very foundations of the ideocratic regime. He
appreciated that Solzhenitsyn was writing for the future, when a new generation of pragmatic
and public-spirited leaders might be willing to make a clean break with ideocracy. As Aron
astutely observed in In Defense of Decadent Europe, “By inviting the Soviet leaders to give up
militant atheism, Solzhenitsyn is asking—and knows he is asking—for ideological surrender.
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The leaders would gain millions of good citizens, but not good Soviet citizens. There cannot be
two metaphysics of salvation. Stripped of its atheism, Marxism- Leninism would lose the
principle of authority on which its visionary super-reality rests and on which it relies for its
judgments upon profane reality.”10 By becoming one ordinary regime among others, the
Soviet regime would make its peace with profane reality and thus prepare the way for the
definitive end of totalitarian- ism and a return of basic human liberties.
Aron also noted that Solzhenitsyn preferred “liberalization” to revolution for wholly humane
reasons—in the multinational U.S.S.R. violent revolution risked tearing the nation apart, setting
one nationality against another, and creating the possibilities of a new despotism.11 But Aron
saw what few readers of the Letter appreciated: Solzhenitsyn nowhere endorsed
authoritarianism as choice-worthy in itself. Aron even compared Solzhenitsyn’s choice for
liberalization over revolution to Friedrich Hayek’s well-known preference for liberalism over
democracy.12 Aron acknowledged Solzhenitsyn’s dislike for the “lack of restraint, the
exhibitionism, and the vulgarity of Western electoral warfare”13 but he never confused that
dislike for a systematic condemnation of political liberty.
In his critique of Marxist “prophetism” in the opening pages of In Defense of Decadent Europe,
Aron draws on the Letter’s denunciation of a “decrepit” and “hopelessly antiquated doctrine,”14
Marxism-Leninism, one which does not begin to speak to the needs of modern men and
women. In Aron’s view, Solzhenitsyn’s Letter had powerfully exposed the bankruptcy of “two
pseudoscientific myths: Marxism (the destruction of capitalism by its internal contradictions)
and Marxism-Leninism (the transformation of society—or even la condition humaine—by the
abolishment of private ownership of the means of production.”15 Solzhenitsyn pointed out that
“even during its best decades … [Ideology] was totally mistaken in its predictions and was
never a science.” It was terribly mistaken when it forecast that the “proletariat”—a mythical or
ideological category in itself—would be endlessly oppressed in capitalist society. It “missed the
point when it asserted that the prosperity of the European countries depended on their
colonies.” Its prediction that the state would “wither away” under the auspices of Communism
“was sheer delusion, ignorance of human nature.”16
In the great debate between Solzhenitsyn and his fellow dissident Andrei Sakharov over “the
function of ideology”17 Aron sided with Solzhenitsyn. Solzhenitsyn had argued in the Letter
that it was the “same antiquated legacy of the Progressive Doctrine” that endowed the Soviet
leadership “with all the mill- stones” that were dragging them—and the country—down.
Solzhenitsyn argued for the systematic de-ideologization of the Soviet state and subtly
showed how ideological tyranny and ideological skepticism coexisted in the Soviet Union of
the 1970s. Ideology did nothing but “sap the strength of the Soviet people.” It “clogs up the
whole life of society—minds, tongues, radio and press—with lies, lies, lies.” Solzhenitsyn
brilliantly highlighted the paradox at the center of decayed Sovietism: “everything was steeped
in lies and everybody knows it.”18
The distinguished Soviet physicist and human rights activist Andrei Sakharov shared
Solzhenitsyn’s opposition to Communist ideology—to the institutionalized lie—but believed that
ideology was merely a cover for the cynical self-interest of the Soviet leadership. Aron believed
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that Solzhenitsyn had a much more profound grasp of the coexistence of faith and skepticism
in the minds and hearts of the Soviet leadership and homo sovieticus more broadly. MarxismLeninism was much more than a superficial and cynical cover for despotism of a tradition- al
sort. It had created a web of mendacity about the past, the present, the future, and the human
condition itself, that was the key to unraveling the Soviet enigma. The Letter to the Soviet
Leaders was for Aron the clearest and most penetrating analysis of the mixture of violence and
lies that defined ideological despotism. Aron was sensitive to Solzhenitsyn’s “art of writing”—
his seemingly modest “pragmatic” advice to the old men of the Politburo to abandon ideology
even as they held on to power masked his genuinely radical intentions—and his fundamentally
“libertarian” aims as a writer and thinker. At the end of part 1 of In Defense of Decadent Europe
(“Europe Mystified by Marxism-Leninism”) Aron attacks the conformism of intellectuals who
had already begun to murmur about Solzhenitsyn’s conservatism and his suspicious
attachment to Old Russia and to the religion of his forebears. Citing the distinguished political
theorist Claude Lefort, a man of the anti-totalitarian Left who admired Solzhenitsyn, Aron
comments on the “anti-authoritarianism” evident in Solzhenitsyn’s writings such as The Gulag
Archipelago.19 Reading the Letter in continuity with the broader anti-totalitarian vision of
Solzhenitsyn, Aron rightly saw in it the same love of liberty and intense but moderate and
humane patriotism that informed Solzhenitsyn’s other writings. Aron’s reception of the 1973
Letter still stands out for its lucidity and for its rare willingness to understand Solzhenitsyn on
his own terms.
A Parisian Encounter
I will now turn to three articles from 1975, 1976, and 1980 respectively, that reveal the extent
of Aron’s admiration for and agreement with Solzhenitsyn. The first is a beautiful text on
“Solzhenitsyn’s Message”20 that appeared in the Parisian Le Figaro on April 18, 1975, two
days after Solzhenitsyn had appeared on Bernard Pivot’s Apostrophes program with the excommunist Pierre Daix, the conservative-minded essayist and novelist (and Figaro contributor)
Jean d’Ormesson, and Jean Daniel, the editor-in-chief of the left-of-center newsmagazine Le
nouvel observateur. Aron notes in his Mémoires that the personality of the zek had touched
him deeply: “coming from another world,” he found in Solzhenitsyn “an extraordinary man,
whose like would be difficult to find anywhere in the world.”21 Aron comments that neither Daix
nor d’Ormesson had made much of an impression that evening precisely because neither had
tried to. But Daniel adopted a confrontational stance toward Solzhenitsyn, comparing his own
“fights against French or American imperialism to the struggle Solzhenitsyn carried out against
the Kremlin.”22 Daniel also lamented the absence of a representative of the French
Communist party on the Apostrophes panel, thus reinforcing his ideological fidelity to his
Communist “comrades.” Aron concedes in his Mémoires that he was irritated and even
embarrassed by Daniel’s performance. But he denied, quite rightly in my view, that he had
exceeded “the bounds of legitimate controversy” as Daniel would suggest a few years later in
his book L’Ere des ruptures. In that work, Daniel suggested that Aron had “abandoned
reasoned argument and waxed indignant, with uncharacteristic violence, because I had not
bowed before an exceptional man.”23 An examination of Aron’s column tells another story.
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Aron begins by saying that if Dostoevsky had come back from the House of the Dead, from his
years in a Tsarist prison camp, no one would have “proposed a tsarist bureaucrat or a lackey
of this bureaucracy as an interlocutor.” But by “regretting” the absence of a French Communist
on the Apostrophes panel, Daniel had “condemned himself to a thankless role.” He had
reduced Solzhenitsyn to the status of a mere politician or political partisan. Aron did not deny
that Solzhenitsyn’s “intentions, works, and life constitute political realities possessing all the
weight of suffering and genius.” But Daniel had failed to see that Solzhenitsyn’s convictions
ultimately “transcend politics because they animate an exceptional personality, because in the
last analysis they are spiritual.” Eschewing every reductive or materialist explanation, Aron saw
at work in Solzhenitsyn nothing less than a spiritual “faith in liberty and an unconditional
devotion to the truth.” “By asking the author of Cancer Ward to express opinions on the events
of the day, the editor-in chief of Le nouvel observateur lowered the dialogue to the level of
ordinary political debates.”
Aron also denied that anyone in the West was fighting the same battle as Solzhenitsyn. No
one on the Right or Left in the West had taken “the long journey through the concentration
camp world and drawn from these same trials the invincible strength to resist the infernal
machine.” Aron did not regret writing books and articles on Algerian independence. But he
could not compare his struggles and sacrifices with the author of One Day in the Life of Ivan
Denisovich. When Daniel put himself on the same plane as Solzhenitsyn, he falsified reality
and failed to recognize the terrible uniqueness of totalitarianism. Such moral equivalence was
possible only among those who benefited from the unfettered freedom of the Western world
and mistook that freedom for oppression.
Aron did not deny that Solzhenitsyn’s judgments about cur- rent events (for example, his views
about Vietnam, Portugal, or Chile) were open to challenge. “Salazar’s regime has left a
population that is half illiterate; the Chilean generals use and abuse repression and torture…
The Communists of North Vietnam will at least end the war.” But Solzhenitsyn is right about
the essential point. He challenges the “lie” that allows ideologues in the West to excuse the
“huge Gulags” of the totalitarian East while expressing indignation about the smaller ones in
right-wing dictatorships. He reminds us of the immutable truth that “camps remain camps
whether they are brown or red.” Solzhenitsyn challenges the self- satisfaction of “progressive”
intellectuals who found reasons to excuse the “good camps” that were sanctified by the
socialist cause. For decades, they saw in the homeland of the gulag archipelago the most
“humane” political order in the world.
Aron’s column ends by contrasting Jean Daniel’s obsession with the “unity of the Left” with the
moral grandeur of Solzhenitsyn. Solzhenitsyn’s greatness crushes, overwhelms, all who
confront it. Moreover, Aron observes that the millions of Frenchmen who viewed Apostrophes
could not help but hear a “message of charity, faith and hope,” a message that was also
illumined in Solzhenitsyn’s face and eyes. Aron, the unbeliever, freely acknowledged the
theological virtues that were displayed by Solzhenitsyn. What the reader confronts is not an
Aron overcome by indignation but rather one who faithfully describes spiritual greatness as it
appears before him. The capacity to admire is a capacity that tends to wither in a democratic
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age. Aron’s column of April 18, 1975 is impressive not only for its lucidity about Solzhenitsyn’s
message, one that is ultimately more spiritual than political, but for its ability to describe
“greatness of soul” in an age that denies the soul’s power or very existence. It is my surmise
that Aron reproduced the column on “Solzhenitsyn’s Message” verbatim in his Mémoires to
convey the “phénomène Soljenitsyne” as he first encountered it rather than to simply score
points with a French intellectual still in the grips of the “myth of the Left.” In his Mémoires, Aron
notes that Daniel could see in the North Vietnamese only a David fighting the goliath of
American imperialism. Solzhenitsyn, in contrast, “saw in Vietnam in addition a new
communism and new Gulags, and he was right.”24 Solzhenitsyn was the witness from the
East who testified to the power of the ideological Lie to distort the ability of intellectuals to see
the world clearly.
Solzhenitsyn and Sartre
A year after the publication of “Solzhenitsyn’s Message” Aron published a powerful reflection
(“Solzhenitsyn and European Leftism”25) on the encounter between Solzhenitsyn and the
figure the Russian writer disparagingly calls in The Oak and the Calf the “ruler of minds” in the
West, Jean-Paul Sartre. Written for a festschrift for his friend Manès Sperber, the Austrianborn anti- Communist novelist and essayist, this piece is Aron’s most insightful tribute to
Solzhenitsyn and arguably his most scathing critique of Jean-Paul Sartre.
Aron begins by noting that Solzhenitsyn had refused to meet the “Sartres” when they were
guests of honor of the Writer’s Union in the Soviet Union in the mid-1960s and requested a
meeting with him. In The Oak and the Calf, Solzhenitsyn wonders “whether Sartre discerned in
my refusal the depth of our aversion to him.”26 Later on, Simon de Beauvoir could only
speculate that Sartre knew Solzhenitsyn better than Solzhenitsyn knew Sartre, a claim that
Aron adamantly rejects. Sartre, the itinerant philosopher who led the life of a student loafer,
could not possibly begin to understand or appreciate the moral witness of Solzhenitsyn.
Nor could Sartre and Beauvoir, “litterateurs” who put their works on the same level as people,
begin “to understand Solzhenitsyn’s rebuff.”27 “As a personality Sartre embodies everything
which Solzhenitsyn loathes: the rejection of moral guidelines, the refusal to accept the age-old
distinction between good and evil, the sacrifice of men’s lives and the justification of crimes by
appeals to an indefinite future (‘indefinite’ in all its senses), in short, the evil of ideology—a
kind of evil which in Sartre’s case takes on a pure form—indirect, delegated evil.”28 For Sartre,
“Marxism is the unsurpassable philosophy of our era,” a dogmatic and even “stupid”29
affirmation that allowed him to justify the unjustifiable. Sartre defended the Soviet Union during
the darkest days of Stalinism before heading off to Cuba to befriend Castro in the early years
of the Cuban revolution. His heart and head always leaped to the Left. In Aron’s pungent
formulation, the Sartres “justify Evil by justifying the justification of it.”30
The “Sartres” were not dogmatic Marxists so much as “philosophers of ideological thinking”31
who embodied the unthinking “Leftism” that Solzhenitsyn pilloried in his major writings. For
them, “anti-Communists are blackguards”32 and the only people who have the right to criticize
Marxism “are those who become involved in the movement.” To attack Soviet concentration
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camps or repression is to side with the camp of the “rightists,” to doom oneself to the cause of
reaction. Sartre, the “philosopher of freedom,” had committed himself to a “categorical
imperative of Revolt” which was all too often coextensive with the “categorical imperative of
violence.” In a work such as the Critique of Dialectical Reason, Sartre justified violence in the
name of human emancipation and as a liberating end in itself.
Solzhenitsyn, in contrast, made no subtle distinction between Marxism and Marxism-Leninism.
Marxism was “quite simply the doctrine in whose name the Bolsheviks seized power,
destroyed first political parties, then the peasantry, set up concentration camps and murdered
millions upon millions of ordinary citizens.”33 For Solzhenitsyn, far from being the
“unsurpassable philosophy of our era” Marxism was the “root of all ill, the source of
falsehood,”34 the principle that justified and thus amplified terror and tyranny, making them
“necessary” instruments for the trans- formation of human beings and the world. It is Marxist
ideology that “gives the criminal a clear conscience.” In Solzhenitsyn’s memorable phrase from
the first volume of The Gulag Archipelago, “thanks to ideology the twentieth century was fated
to experience evildoing on a scale calculated in the millions.” Solzhenitsyn did not deny that
other doctrines besides Marxism (e.g., nationalism, colonialism, even the political use and
abuse of Christianity) could provide ideological fodder for tyranny. But Marxism has a special
place in the catalogue of ideological evil because the “quantitative” difference brought about
by its extermination of tens of millions marks a “qualitative” change in the nature of despotism
itself.35 Marxism is ideology par excellence. “Evil needs an ideology before it can operate in
the millions”36 and Marxism-Leninism provides the social theory which, in Solzhenitsyn’s
words, “gives evildoing its long-sought justification.”
Aron suggests that if they had ended up meeting, the dialogue between Solzhenitsyn and
Sartre would have amounted to nothing. Solzhenitsyn rightly emphasized the intrinsic
perversity and mendacity of Communist totalitarianism. Compared to Lenin’s or Stalin’s (or
even Brezhnev’s) Soviet Union, Franco’s Spain was a liberal order where men could breathe
freely and speak their minds. Sartre, in contrast, continued to identify “progressive” forms of
despotism with liberation, emancipation. In the conclusion of his essay, Aron unapologetically
sides with Solzhenitsyn. He endorses his “message” which can be summarized in “two
fundamental sentences”: “there is something worse than poverty and repression— and that
something is the Lie; the lesson this century teaches us is to recognize the deadly snare of
ideology, the illusion that men and societies can be transformed at a stroke.”37
Aron understood that compulsory lying defined the Soviet regime in its Stalinist and postStalinist forms. The myriad lies that were demanded in the workplace, schools, press, and
what passed for public life—the demand that one say what one knew not to be true—was
rooted in a more fundamental “ontological” or “meta- physical” Lie—“the illusion that men and
societies can be trans- formed at a stroke.” This was the Big Lie that gave rise to the
suffocating tyranny of ideological clichés, to what Solzhenitsyn called in “Our Muzzled
Freedom” “the lie as a form of existence.” Soviet ideocracy was a soul-numbing despotism that
was far more insidious and inhuman than a mere authoritarian order with its restrictions on
political liberty and human rights. Even more than violence, the Lie was the principle that set in
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motion the totalitarian regime. This is why Solzhenitsyn insisted that “non-participation in
lies”38—the refusal to spout official slogans, repeat mendacities, or denounce colleagues—
was the sine qua non for both self-respect and for the return of something resembling normal
civic life. Only when the flower of the nation had jettisoned the Lie could “breathing and
consciousness return.”39 Solzhenitsyn fought less for democracy, which he hoped would
come in due time, than for an end to ideocratic despotism which not only oppressed men’s
bodies but demanded of them their souls as well.
Writing in 1976, Aron identifies with the “vast silent mass” who side with Solzhenitsyn (and his
friend Manès Sperber) against unrepentant ideologues in the academy and mass media. They
do so by recognizing that mankind has no future except by rejecting “ideological knavery” and
respecting “moral laws.”40 Against the categorical imperative of violence, against the nihilism
inherent in both radical voluntarism (existentialism) and radical determinism (MarxismLeninism), Aron asserts freedom within nature and a moral law which provides a compass for
thinking and acting man. Something after all has come from the dialogue between the Russian
zek and the French existentialist cum Marxist. One might say that Aron’s own liberalism has
been given greater moral depth by his sympathetic encounter with the Russian zek and by his
adamant repudiation of the quasi-nihilism of his youthful friend from the École normale
supérieure. In the encounter that he has sketched between Sartre and Solzhenitsyn, the
Russian “dissident” and the European leftist, Aron finds wisdom.
Misconceptions About Russia
Aron’s last major treatment of Solzhenitsyn occurred in a column he wrote forL’Express, dated
May 17–23, 1980.41 The column was occasioned by the French publication of Solzhenitsyn’s
L’Erreur de l’occident, a lengthy essay that had originally been published in Foreign Affairs
under the title “Misconceptions about Russia Are a Threat to America.”42 In this thoughtful and
spirited essay, Solzhenitsyn argued that even many who opposed Communism did not
appreciate the extent of its hostility to mankind as a whole. He argued that “there exist no
‘better’ variants of Communism” and “that it is incapable of growing ‘kinder,’ that it cannot
survive as an ideology without using terror, and that, consequently, to coexist with
Communism on the same planet is impossible.”43 The bulk of the essay was directed against
a “second and equally prevalent mistake” that assumed “an indissoluble link between the
universal disease of Communism and the country where it first seized control—Russia.”44
It is the second point that Aron takes up in his column. Like Solzhenitsyn, he challenges the
“spontaneous explanation of Sovietism by the Russian past.” Both Aron and Solzhenitsyn
insist on the “specificity of Communism,” an ideological movement and political order that are
“unprecedented in human history.” Aron endorses Solzhenitsyn’s suggestive claim that as long
as Communism was admired in the West, “it was preferred as the unquestionable dawn of a
new era; as soon as it was condemned, people hastened to explain it by the traditional servility
of the Russians.” General de Gaulle may have been right that in the long run “ideologies pass
but nations remain.” But he was wrong to see in Stalin merely a new Tsar who loved Russia in
his own way. And he failed to appreciate the extent to which the body and soul of historic
Russia had been mutilated beyond recognition by Communist ideology. Aron does not deny “a
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certain continuity between tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union: administrative forms persist,
old traditions have not suddenly disappeared.” But on the crucial question, he sided with
Solzhenitsyn: Bolshevik despotism was not an epiphenomenal expression of “eternal Russia.”
One saw the “repetition of the specific traits of totalitarianism in all the countries conquered by
a Marxist-Leninist party.” Stalin, a Georgian, was no more an expression of eternal Russia
than Pol Pot was an expression of eternal Cambodia.
Aron also endorsed Solzhenitsyn’s rejection of certain “fictions current in the West.” Compared
to the Soviet regime, the Tsarist regime was indeed comparatively liberal. There were no
camps, political prisoners were small in number and prisoners were well treated. Universities
“enjoyed an intellectual freedom comparable to those of Western universities.” The Okhrana,
the Tsarist secret police, was an amateur organization compared to the Cheka-GPU-KGB
established by the Bolsheviks in 1917. Most importantly, “the enslavement of thought to the
truth of state, of civil society in its entirety to the decrees of an omnipresent power, represents
neither an extrapolation nor a perfecting of the prerevolutionary regime.” Aron insists that such
an enslavement of the human spirit belongs to the twentieth century and “constitutes its
cancer, its permanent threat.” It cannot plausibly be blamed on the Russian old regime.
Like Solzhenitsyn, Aron believed that the Soviet leaders found legitimacy in the ideology they
professed. Ideology was the anchor of Soviet life and it and it alone vouched for the truth of
the “super-reality” supposedly inaugurated by the October revolution. The sheer recalcitrance
of human nature and society made terror and lies inevitable. Only through them could the
party-state “fictively reconcile … words and reality.” Aron did not deny that the Soviet Union
was a modern industrial society that needed to “integrate individuals into organizations.” As
Aron laconically observes, “Sovietism is born of the conjunction of a party resolved to acquire
total power and the tendency to bureaucratization which is typical of technical civilization.” But
neither bureaucrat- ic theory nor the concept of industrial society provided the key for
understanding an ideological despotism of the Soviet sort. That secret lay in the dialectic of
reality and ideological super-reality that defined the drama of Soviet life from its creation in
1917 until its self-destruction at the end of the 1980s. Near the end of his column, Aron
endorsed Solzhenitsyn’s judgment that Communism was everywhere “anti-national” and that
the function of ideology was to “kill the national body in which it develops.” There was no
essential connection between the Russian old regime and the Soviet Union, between the
Russian nation and ideocratic despotism.
Aron’s—and Solzhenitsyn’s—approach allows one to under- stand the restoration of a nonideological Russian state after 1991 as the victory of the national “body” over the ideological
cancer which had dominated and sickened it for so long. Of course, post- Communist Russia is
far from a developed democracy and some important residues and habits of Sovietism persist.
But the basic liberties that existed in Russia before the October 1917 revolution have all been
restored. Thought is no longer enslaved to the truth of the state. Rather than lamenting the
eternal servility of Russians, Westerners ought to welcome the return of Russia to a relatively
normal form of national and political life. We should not be surprised that it is taking
considerable time for Russia to descend fully from the “icy cliffs” of totalitarianism. Soviet
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despotism was no ordinary dictatorship. In a negative way, the Soviet regime succeeded in
creating a homo sovieticus whose habits of servility are indeed incompatible with the
enterprise, initiatives and self-government characteristic of a free society.
In the final paragraph of his L’Express piece, Aron reports on an instructive exchange about
Solzhenitsyn he had recently had with an Irish academic. In a presentation on Soviet foreign
policy he had delivered to the Royal Academy of Ireland, Aron had invoked the debate
between Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov and had sided with Solzhenitsyn. His respondent, a
“charming” Irish professor of Gaelic, had summarily dismissed the testimony of Solzhenitsyn,
coming as it had from an “Old Believer.” The Irish professor was also adamant that ideology
was “cynically employed” by the Soviet leaders and was of no fundamental importance. But it
was precisely the jettisoning of that ideology that transformed the USSR into Russia and that
offers hope for the future. However cynically employed, ideology was indeed the key to Soviet
legitimacy as both Solzhenitsyn and Aron always argued. One is also struck by Aron’s refusal
to caricature Solzhenitsyn along the lines of the Irish professor. He does not dis- miss or mock
Solzhenitsyn’s deeply felt Christian convictions nor does he confuse his patriotic attachments
with a virulent form of nationalism. From beginning to end, Aron saw in Solzhenitsyn the
scourge of ideological despotism, the advocate of a more humane future for Russia and the
West. There is nothing in Solzhenitsyn’s life or thought after 1980 that in any way demands a
refinement of Aron’s judgments about the Russian writer.
Two Spiritual Families?
What accounts for the remarkable affinities between the French political thinker, a liberal
rooted in the secular traditions of the West, and the Russian writer who fought totalitarianism in
the name of human dignity and the best spiritual traditions of his native Russia? Whatever their
ultimate spiritual differences, Aron and Solzhenitsyn shared a common devotion to truth and
liberty as well as a shared hatred of the ideological lie. Moreover, there are remarkable
similarities between the “philosophy of history” affirmed by both men. In The Red Wheel,
beginning with August 1914, Solzhenitsyn attacked historical fatalism whether in the form of
Marxist determinism or Tolstoyan fatalism.45 “The Red Wheel,” the churning force of
destructive revolution, only became “inevitable” due to the moral abdication of those
responsible for Russia’s fate. As we have emphasized throughout this work, Solzhenitsyn
always defended the free will of human beings and saw it splendidly at work in a noble
statesman such as Pyotr Stolypin, Prime Minister of Russia from 1906 to 1911, who heroically
tried to steer a “middle line of social development” in the years before his assassination in
September 1911. For Solzhenitsyn, human beings are never without choices and should never
resign themselves to evil in the name of an alleged historical inevitability.
Aron, too, refused to bow before what he called “pseudo-fatality” and was a tireless critic of the
“idolatry of History.”46 His philosophy of history emphasized both the limits or constraints of
choice and the margins of liberty available to human beings. This agnostic paradoxically
acknowledged a transcendent space above human action and the human will and experienced
“horror” before the ideological breakdown of the distinction between the “sacred and the
profane.”47 He was appalled by “progressive” Christians who succumbed to “secular religion”
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and who placed all their hopes in an unfolding Historical Process.48 These politicized
Christians had lost faith in spiritual imperatives that give dignity to man and as a result
confused “one class and the Messiah,” “one regime and the kingdom of God.”49 With no other
criterion than the truth of History or the pretenses of an ideological party, the militant, whether
Marxist, existentialist, or Christian progressive, had succumbed to nihilism. Aron refused to
reduce man to revolutionary political action or to subordinate the individual to the alleged
requirements of History since both paths deprived men of “the means of rejecting the
unacceptable.”50 For Aron, “ethics judges politics as much as politics judges ethics.” As he
eloquently stated in the concluding words of his English-language “Introduction” to Marxism
and the Existentialists (1969), “the worst error would be to fail to recognize the dialectic which
deter- mines our condition and to totally surrender to nihilism or fanaticism, either by denying
all spiritual imperatives or by trusting blindly in an alleged determinism of history.”51
These analyses confirm that Aron and Solzhenitsyn did not belong to completely different
spiritual families after all. Both took aim at the dual specters of nihilism and fanaticism that
haunted modern civilization. Both were sensitive to the “crisis” of modern civilization, to the
decline of civic spirit when free peoples were confronted by the totalitarian challenge.52 Both
eloquently and forcefully affirmed the free will and moral responsibility of human beings. Both
refused to explain away natural justice as so many modern intellectuals are prone to do.53 In
Aron’s engagement with Solzhenitsyn, one witnesses a rare form of intellectual and spiritual
communion, a spiritual encounter that is worthy of our admiration and that still has much to
teach us today.
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